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SIGNALING SYSTEM SEVEN: A CASE
STUDY IN LOCAL TELEPHONE
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Shannon M. Heim*
Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") to
"promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.''
The 1996 Act sought to revolutionize the local telephone market by
introducing competitive mandates that forced incumbent local exchange
carriers ("ILECs") to offer access to pieces of the telephone network
infrastructure to competitors at wholesale prices.' Although many competitive
local exchange carriers' ("CLECs") and third-party providers4 complain that
Associate, Dorsey & Whitney LLP. Ms. Heim specializes in the adjudication of local
competition issues before regulatory and judicial forums. The opinions expressed in this
article are those of Ms. Heim and do not represent the opinion of Dorsey & Whitney or any
client of the firm. Ms. Heim wishes to thank her colleagues and family for their support and
contributions to this article.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in various Sections of 47 U.S.C.) [herein-
after 1996 Act].
2 See THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MAJOR
AMENDMENTS, 1934-1996 31 (Max D. Paglin et al. eds., Pike and Fischer, Inc. 1999) [here-
inafter COMMS. ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] ("The Telecommunications Act of 1996 brought
the most substantial changes in the regulation of telecommunications services since adop-
tion of the Communications Act in 1934."); see 47 U.S.C. §251 (2000) (requiring incum-
bents to offer network elements to competitors on an unbundled basis.). The unbundling
requirements were primarily directed to the Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs"
or "Baby Bells") who, despite regulatory and legislative pressure, still maintained a near
monopoly of the local telephone market. All RBOCs are ILECs, but not all ILECs are
RBOCs. This article's analysis of local competition in signaling focuses on the regulation
of and actions by the RBOCs.
3 There were few providers offering meaningful local competition to the RBOCs when
Congress enacted the 1996 Act. The competitive carrier industry experienced a rapid rate of
growth between 1997 and approximately 2000. "The business case [for CLEC growth] was
compelling enough for investors and vendors to embrace it enthusiastically. These financial
backers lavished companies in the space with remarkable funding and an unusual mandate:
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regulators have not done enough to ensure an equitable marketplace, the 1996
Act and the ensuing competition has indisputably changed the landscape of the
industry in many respects.' For example, in 1995, the last full year before
passage of the Act, less than one percent of the total end-users' access lines
were served by a carrier competing with the Regional Bell Operating Company
("RBOC").6 As of December 2003, more than sixteen percent of the total end-
Grow as fast as possible, regardless of any damage to the bottom line." Bob Ferchat &
Tony Carlson, Telecom-Dead or Alive?, The CEO Refresher, at http://www.refresher.com
[hereinafter Telecom-Dead or Alive?]. The grandiose plans of many CLECs came to a
crashing end in 2001. "Bloodied with red ink and freefalling stock prices, many high-
profile competitors have closed their doors, and several appear to be following." Liane H.
LaBarbra, Regional Carriers Thriving amid National CLEC Wreckage, TELEPHONY.ONLINE,
at http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecomregional carriers thriving/index.htm (June 17,
2002) ("Though most national CLECs are gone or are gasping for air, some smaller, re-
gional providers see opportunity amid the current conditions..."). The remaining CLECs
have built a viable business model based on investment in network infrastructure independ-
ent from the ILEC. See THE CEO REFRESHER. TELECOM-DEAD OR ALIVE?, at
http://www.refresher.com/ceo.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
Like all good cons the pitch was based on truth, but truth exaggerated to drive unrea-
sonable levels of expectation for wealth creation at unsustainable rates ... It is unlikely
that the boom times of 1998-2001 will occur again in precisely the same way. That's
not necessarily a bad thing, for there is something to be said for steady if unspectacular
growth and profitability." Even in 1998, some analysts were predicting a flip-side to
the outrageous growth of the telecom boom[;] with a boom, there's always a bust.
Dan O'Shea, Bang Boom Bust: VC Firms Are Sizing Up the Wild New Carrier Industry,
TELEPHONY.ONLINE, at http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecombangboombust/index.htm
(Sept. 7, 1998); see also Mike Farrell, ICG Tanks, Depressing Other CLECs,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Oct. 2, 2000) ("Stocks in the once-hot competitive local-exchange
carrier sector dropped like stones last week in the wake of discouraging news from ICG
Communications Inc.").
4 Third-party providers of competitive services are the true success story of the 1996
Act. In the years since passage of the Act, a cottage industry has developed whereby third-
party vendors develop services to sell to CLECs as a bypass to the ILEC network and ser-
vices. However, the 1996 Act made for some strange bedfellows. CLECs invested in data
providers and reaped significant rewards. Abby Christopher, Enemy Mine: The Data CLEC
Investment Paradox, TELEPHONY.ONLINE, Nov 29, 1999 ("[T]he terms and conditions of
relationships among data CLECs and their investment partners and strategic partners are
tenuous at best. Longer term, even data CLECs with wholesale business models and their
strategic investment partners may find themselves at odds over who will build and brand
value-added IP services.").
5 During Section 271 proceedings commenced by RBOCs seeking authorization to enter
the InterLATA, the long distance market in each state, CLECs offered evidence alleging the
RBOC obstructed competition in some fashion. See In re App'n by SBC Comms., Inc.,
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., and Southwestern Bell Comms. Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwest-
em Bell Long Distance Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996 to Provide
In-Region InterLATA Services in Texas, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd.
18354, paras. 68-69 (2000) (finding that SBC had sufficiently opened its markets to satisfy
the competitive checklist and gain approval of its application, despite CLECs' complaints
that SBC's ordering processes resulted in blocked trunks and ultimately lost customers).
6 See Local Competition Report, FCC, Industry Analysis Division, Common Carrier Bu-
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user switched access lines, nearly 30 million customers, belonged to CLECs.7
Over the last eight years, the broad reaching policy goals and
implementation of the statutory language of the 1996 Act have been the subject
of numerous seminars, articles and discussion.8 In a further effort to examine
the evolution of competition in the local market, this article focuses on how an
essential telecommunications technology service, Signaling System Seven
("SS7"), has achieved competitive results through the implementation of the
local competition provisions articulated in the 1996 Act, and evaluates whether
similar competitive results can be achieved in other aspects of local
telecommunications services.9
I. EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC SWITCHED TELEPHONE
NETWORK
The Public Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN") grew from a mere
260,795 telephones in 1892" to the virtually complete integration of
telecommunications technology into every home in America currently enjoyed
in the United States.' For decades, monopoly interests controlled development
of the network and necessarily emphasized deployment of basic telephone
reau 5 (Dec. 1998).
7 See Local Competition Statistics, FCC, Industry Analysis Division, Common Carrier
Bureau I (June 2004). At least one CLEC serves customers in 75% of the nation's zip
codes. Id. at 3. Customers enjoy even more robust competition in 14% of the nation's zip
codes where there are at least ten CLECs offering service. Id. at 4.
8 Robert W. Crandall et al, Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based
Investment?, B.E. J. IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y (2004) ("Our results indicate that facilities-
based line growth relative to UNE growth was faster in states where the cost of UNEs was
higher relative to the cost of facilities-based investment."); Michael F. Finn, The Public In-
terest and Bell Entry into Long-Distance Under Section 271 of the Communications Act, 5
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 203 (1997); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative
Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001); Stacy
Schwartz, Telephone Competition Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 9 MEDIA L. &
POL'Y 33 (2001) (examining the competitive effects of the 1996 Act on the local markets
using Bell Atlantic's Section 271 approval in New York as an example of success); Kim-
berly L. Sharkey, Comment, Confusion in the Wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 831 (2001).
9 A case study allows a more concrete examination and evaluation of competition in lo-
cal telephony than can be done in the abstract.
10 See COMMS. ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 33-34. The patent law ini-
tially protected Alexander Graham Bell's monopoly on the telephone. The period of patent
protection has been characterized as a "stagnant" period for growth of telephone ownership.
I Telephone service comprises approximately 2% of household expenditures in the
United States. Paul Zimmerman, Reference Book of Rates, Price Indices, and Household
Expenditures for Telephone Service, FCC, Wireline Competition Bureau, iv. (July 1, 2004).
The average monthly charge for local telephone service is $24.75. Id. at Table 1.1.
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service. 2 The evolution of the PSTN was made possible by technology that
added increasing flexibility and efficiency over many years. It evolved from
an initial regulatory regime dedicated to first preserving the monopoly position
in the local markets of the Bell Operating Companies, to a regulatory
commitment to open the markets to competition. 3
A. Technological Development of the PSTN Led to Advancements in the
Signaling Network
The telephone invented by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876 carried a voice
signal from the receiver to the listener.'4 The quality of the signal, and thus the
quality of the voice pattern, improved over time.'5 In the late 1800s, the
telephone continued to require an operator to complete the call to the requested
party.'6 In 1889, the rotary dial was introduced which allowed customers to
directly connect to the desired number. 7  The Bell Telephone Company
dominated the telephone service market, but the low level of subscribership
made holding a monopoly position less than a remarkable accomplishment.
8
Slowly, telephone technology and marketing improved, and more households
connected to the "Bell System."9
The Bell System grew, but faced competition from independent carriers."
The American Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT&T") was formed to
12 See COMMS. ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 34 ("AT & T ... changed
the telephone industry from a competitive industry to a shared monopoly.").
13 See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act
of 1996; Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Comm'l Mobile Radio Ser-
vice Providers; First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499, paras. 1-5 (1996) [hereinafter
Local Competition Order] (discussing evolution of telecommunications regulation and spe-
cific impacts of the 1996 Act).
14 See STEVEN SHEPARD, TELECOM CRASH COURSE 131 (McGraw Hill 2002) [hereinafter
TELECOM CRASH COURSE].
15 See id. at 130-35.
16 In 1889, a Kansas City undertaker, Almon Brown Strowger, suspected that his calls
were being diverted to a rival. Upon investigation, he discovered the wife of his arch busi-
ness rival had taken the position of operator and was passing calls to her husband. Furious,
Strowger devised a mechanism to connect calls mechanically without the interference of an
operator. Strowger continued his work on telephony technology and eventually patented an
automatic switch. See Tom Farley's Telephone History Series (2004), at
http://www.privateline.com/TelephoneHistory2/HistoryA2.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004)
[hereinafter Telephone History Series].
17 Telephone technology continued to advance which led to a more marketable product.
See id.
18 See TELECOM CRASH COURSE, supra note 14, at 130-33.
19 See id., at 132-34.
20 See Telephone History Series, supra note 16.
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serve the long distance needs of the Bell customers.' Independents were not
allowed to connect to AT&T's system which led to isolation for those
customers.22 Under significant pressure from the Department of Justice in
1913, AT&T revised its position and allowed independents to connect to the
long distance network for a fee.23 The nationwide PSTN was born.
Most of the voice trunks deployed in the United States only carried one
voice conversation at a time.24  The demand for trunk capacity rapidly
increased, and in the 1970s, "planners foresaw that availability would be far
outstretched by the mid-1980s even if more and more cables were laid."25
Therefore, a great effort was made to convert the PSTN from analog to digital
to allow existing trunks to carry multiple calls simultaneously.26 An essential
part of that conversion was the development and deployment of a signaling
system capable of handling the demands of a dynamic digital network.27
Signaling refers to the information needed to connect one telephone to another
in order to complete a telephone call.28
21 See id.
22 Cables were laid to join the exchanges, thereby allowing the connection of subscrib-
ers of one exchange to talk to subscribers of another. These cables became known as
"trunks." The term "trunk" was "taken from the Middle Ages when water delivery, rather
than being in pots or tanks, was made by pumping water along 8 inch bored trunks of Elm
with tapered ends for joining." The History of the Telephone, at
http://www.dupre.co.uk/fsindinf7.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter The History of
the Telephone].
23 See Telephone History Series, supra note 16. One strategy used by the Bell System to
develop and preserve its monopoly was to isolate independents as much as possible. AT&T
even refused to sell independents equipment. Under threat of an antitrust action, Thomas
Vail, the CEO of AT&T, divested the company of Western Union stock, agreed not to pur-
chase any more independent telephone companies without government approval, and to fi-
nally connect the independents with the AT&T long distance system. Id.
24 A trunk is "a communication line between two switching systems." HARRY NEWTON,
NEWTON's DICTIONARY 714 (17th Ed. 2001). [hereinafter NEWTON'S DICTIONARY].
25 The History of the Telephone, supra note 22.
26 See id.
27 "From the introduction of Strowger's automatic exchange, subscribers signaled the
telephone number they wanted by turning a dial. As each number was dialed, pulses were
sent down the exchange line." Id. The pulses had to be transmitted one at a time and thus it
took a great deal of time to completely communicate to the network what number you were
dialing. In the 1960s, dial tone signaling was introduced. Each key on the keypad repre-
sented a combination of tones which was recognizable by the exchange. Dial tone signifi-
cantly increased the speed at which a call could be connected. Id.
28 In the Triennial Review Order ("TRO"), the Commission stated that "STPs are packet
switches that provide access to the SS7 network and route SS7 among service switching
points and service control points. These are the traffic controllers of the SS7 network and
typically consist of highly reliable computers running special software." In re Review of
the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implemen-
tation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; De-
ployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capacity, Report
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The increasingly digital PSTN required a more independent means of
communicating between the calling subscriber and the receiving subscriber.29
Multifrequency signaling used the voice trunk for signaling and then carried
the call on the same trunk.3" The communication was faster, but it still
occurred "in-band" 3' so it failed to provide the versatility the network really
needed. Development of "out-of-band" signaling allowed the signaling
required for call completion to occur on a separate facility than the voice
trunk.32 The transition from in-band to out-of-band signaling greatly improved
the utilization of the PSTN and solved the capacity problems caused by
overuse of trunk facilities.33
The increasing use of computer technology in the 1980s greatly sped the
development of network technology and the pursuit of enhanced
telecommunications services.34 The PSTN experienced significant change as
methods of call processing and network management transformed to provide
the enhanced services demanded by increasingly sophisticated users.3"
Enhanced services, including caller identification, three-party calling, call
forwarding and call waiting required rapid communication between networks
and seamless interface with countless databases.36 The telecommunications
industry focused its research and development resources on technological
advancements, and the result was a separation of signaling from the voice
portion of the PSTN.
and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC
Red. 16978, para. 546 n. 1682 (2003) [hereinafter TRO].
29 LAWRENCE HARTE ET AL., SIGNALING SYSTEM 7 1-2 (Althos Publishing 3d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter HARTE, SIGNALING SYSTEM 7].
30 See TRAvis RUSSELL, SIGNALING SYSTEM #7 4 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter RUSSELL,
SIGNALING SYSTEM #7].
31 "In-band" refers to the location of the signaling. When the signaling occurs on the
same facility as the eventual voice call it is considered to be "in-band." NEWTON'S
DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 346. When the signaling occurs on a separate facility it is
considered to be "out-of-band." Id. at 504.
32 The FCC examined signaling technology and alternatives in the Local Competition
Order. It concluded that ILECs had to provide access to their signaling networks because
"alternative signaling methods, such as in-band signaling, would provide a lower quality of
service." Local Competition Order, supra note 13, at para. 482.
33 See generally The History of the Telephone, supra note 22.
34 See generally RUSSELL, SIGNALING SYSTEM #7, supra note 30.
35 See generally id. "What was once an obscure, little-known technology has become
one of the industry's most prized possessions." Id. at 1.
36 HARTE, SIGNALING SYSTEM 7, supra note 29, at 1-2.
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B. The Rise of Out-of-Band Signaling
The telephony networks could not sustain an acceptable level of quality" in
the face of the rapid growth of telecommunications devices and increasing
demand of consumers as they added multiple telephone lines at their homes to
accommodate the Intemet, fax machines, and wireless telephones.38 Prior to
the use of out-of-band signaling, the PSTN could not have supported the
increased volume of users and data.39 When signaling must occur on the same
voice trunks intended for traffic, the capacity is too quickly exhausted and
ultimately wasted on calls that cannot be completed."
Out-of-band signaling segregates the set up functions of a call to a
physically separate network from the voice trunks.4" The voice trunk is not
engaged unless a call is successfully completed, which avoids the wasted use
of a valuable voice trunk.42 Out-of-band signaling has the "effect of moving
the intelligence out of the PSTN and into a separate network where it could be
somewhat centralized and therefore made available to a much broader
population."43 The separate network also allows for the transport of more data
at higher speeds and allows for signaling at any time in the duration of the call
rather than only in the initiation."
The modem signaling network does more than just connect the sender to the
receiver, although that remains the underlying goal.45 The signaling network
37 Consumers experienced diminishing quality in increasing delays in connection of
their telephone calls. See generally TELECOM CRASH COURSE, supra note 14.
38 "Another implication of competition, number portability, greatly increases the poten-
tial use of SS7 networks. In addition, the ongoing development of new, enhanced services
applications requires quick and reliable SS7 routing capabilities." Dan O'Shea, The Net-
work That's Never Done, TELEPHONY.ONLINE, (Sept. 15, 1997) [hereinafter The Network
That's Never Done]. In 1947, carriers had access to only 86 area codes. Only 61 new codes
were added over the next 50 years. However, due to increased demand, over 100 new area
codes were activated in the 1980s. See In re Numbering Resource Optimization, Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 7574, para. 1-6 (2000).
39 See TELECOM CRASH COURSE, supra note 14, at 146-148.
40 RUSSELL, SIGNALING SYSTEM #7, supra note 30, at 3-4.
41 Id. at 2-4. See also Signaling System 7, at http://www.iec.org/online/tutorials/SS-
7/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) [hereinafter SS7 Tutorial].
42 HARTE, SIGNALING SYSTEM 7, supra note 29.
43 TELECOM CRASH COURSE, supra note 14, at 147.
44 Signaling during a call makes enhanced features, such as call waiting, possible. See
SS7 Tutorial, supra note 41.
45 SS7 allows wireless networks to communicate with wireline networks, which repre-
sents one of its premier benefits. Kathleen Cholewka, Sending the Right Signals: SS7 Tech-
nology, the Wireline Stalwart, Can Beef Up PCS Networks, Too, TELEPHONY.ONLINE, at
http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecomsendingrightsignals/index.htm (Feb. 9, 1998)
("SS7 lets wireless providers use intelligent network features by allowing communications
with databases and servers that contain information about both wireline and wireless sub-
scribers. This allows services such as mobility management and roaming.").
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engages when a caller picks up the phone and dials a number. The information
is transported from the caller to the Signal Switching Point ("SSP"), an SS7
capable voice switch, serving that home to a Signal Transfer Point ("STP"), a
routing packet switch.46 The STP takes the information and determines which
SSP serves the call's destination and routes the information accordingly.47 The
receiving SSP checks the line for availability and sends that information back
along the same path. If the line is busy, that information is passed to the
originating SSP, which gives the caller a busy signal. The entire transaction
occurs in a small fraction of a second without engaging a single voice trunk. If
the line is available, the originating SSP designates a voice trunk to carry the
conversation and gives the caller a ring while the receiving SSP does the same
for the receiving telephone.48 Only when the receiving phone is answered does
a voice trunk engage. The work done by the signaling network seems
instantaneous to the caller and receiver. 9
C. Signaling System Number Seven: Versatility and Utility
The telecommunications industry has experienced explosive change and
growth in recent years. Consumer demand for better and faster
46 See RUSSELL, SIGNALING SYSTEM #7, supra note 30, at 63-65. The FCC identified the
STP as the essential element of a signaling network in the Local Competition Order. "Vir-
tually all parties agree that physical access, or interconnection, to the incumbent LEC's SS7
network should occur at the STP, because it provides essential 'network functions that are
not preformed by other SS7 network elements." Local Competition Order, supra note 13, at
para. 464.
47 RUSSELL, SIGNALING SYSTEM #7, supra note 30, at 63-66.
48 Id. at 64-65 ("The SSP is the local exchange in the telephone network.").
49 Id. at 1-3. The use of 800-number translation services provides a relatively simple
example of how out-of-band signaling works. See NMS COMMUNICATIONS, SS7 AND
INTELLIGENT NETWORKING APPLICATIONS, at http://www.nmscommunications.com/white-
papers/pdf/SS7andlntelligentNetworkingApplications.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) [here-
inafter NMS COMMUNICATIONS]. When a caller dials an 800-number, the local Central Of-
fice ("CO") switch, which acts as an SSP, detects that the call requires special handling and
automatically initiates an Intelligent Network ("IN") trigger function. When the trigger is
activated, the SSP sends a message through the STP to a remote database system, referred to
as a service control point ("SCP"). This message is used by the SSP to request information
regarding the handling of the call. Based on the trigger presented and the call characteris-
tics, the SCP determines the appropriate action and sends the information back to the SSP.
The SSP then handles the call in the appropriate manner. This exchange of information al-
lows the translation information to be passed seamlessly from the caller's switch to the
called party's switch.
50 HARTE, SIGNALING SYSTEM 7, supra note 29. The last fifteen years have brought un-
precedented change in technology that has vastly increased the type of services offered by
telecommunications carriers. Consider that in 1991, the FCC was just beginning to under-
stand what a uniform signaling protocol could bring to users. See In re Rules and Policies
Regarding Calling Number Identification Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 6 FCC
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communications devices has driven the change and growth.' The dramatic
increase in data services has also contributed to the overall growth of the
industry. 2
SS7 53 is the dominant protocol used to run the signaling networks that enable
today's rapid and complex communication. 4 Approximately $1.8 billion is
spent annually on SS7 infrastructure within the PSTN 5  SS7 allows a highly
efficient exchange of information used for call establishment, billing, routing
and information-exchange functions. 6 SS7 facilitates the rapid transmission of
data traffic, making it a crucial component for the provision of
telecommunications services. 7  Many industry players have begun to
Rcd. 6752, para. 1 (1991) ("With the increasing deployment of Signaling System No. 7
switching technology, a panoply of new services is becoming available to callers.").
51 Press Release, Blackberry, BlackBerry Surpasses One Millionth Subscriber Mile-
stone, at http://www.blackberry.com/news/press/pr-03_02_2004.shtml (last visited Feb. 3,
2004) ("This is an important threshold for BlackBerry and even a positive industry indicator
since BlackBerry is now the first integrated wireless data platform to reach the one million
subscriber mark.") (quoting Mike Lazaridis, Pres., Co-CEO and Founder of Research In
Motion).
52 See Tim McElligott, Alternative SS7, TELEPHONY.ONLINE, at
http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom-altemative-ss/index.htm (Mar. 5, 2004) [hereinafter
Alternative SS7].
53 SS7 was developed using the concept of protocol layering. "A layered protocol con-
sists of modular programs, each designed to perform certain groups of functions, and each
designed to be able to offer its functionalities to other modules." SS7 Network Architecture
Tutorial. 1, offered via Internet interface by SS8 Solutions, at http://www.SS8.com/User-
Parts.pdf (2001). The layered protocol approach was adopted in 1983 when some of the
major Telecom companies began to realize the numerous problems that were developing
because computers of numerous types were attempting to communicate with each other over
network connections. As you might expect, version six preceded the successful Signaling
System Number Seven.
54 A SS7 network must include at least two signal switching points ("SSPs") and one
pair of signal transport points ("STP"). The STP acts like a traffic cop in the network direct-
ing the signals coming in to the correct SSP. This configuration removes the requirement
that all of the SSPs be connected to one another. A diagram of a typical SS7 network can be
found on the Internet, at http://www.ss7.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). The tutorial is an
excellent explanation of the network process for signaling.
55 Alternative SS7, supra note 52 ("SS7 networks are still growing at 16% year over
year.").
56 "Signaling systems facilitate the routing of telephone calls between switches and are
necessary components of providing circuit-based telecommunications services." TRO, su-
pra note 28, at para. 542 (citing Local Competition Order, supra note 13, at para. 455).
SS7's functionality includes setup and tear down of a telephone call, the called party's num-
ber, an indication of national, international, or other subscriber information, and the nature
of the circuit (satellite or terrestrial). See Creativst, Glossary Section, at
http://www.creativyst.com/cgi-bin/M/Glos/st/GetTerm.pl?GetTerm=ss7 (last visited Oct.
12, 2004).
57 Out-of-band signaling addresses two significant inevitable problems with traditional,
in-band signaling: 1) 35% of all toll calls are not completed because the phone is busy or
there are equipment problems. The circuit time used in signaling is "substantial, expensive,
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investigate the integration of SS7 into an IP platform to further enhance the
speed and volume of data traffic that can be transmitted. 8 SS7 continues to be
a vibrant technology that adapts to the changing requirements of
telecommunications networks and services. 9 Indeed, "[t]he industry now
recognizes that SS7 holds the key to some very valuable network information
that can have a big impact on carriers' future operational costs and
competitiveness."6 That network information, such as caller identification, has
become an indispensable service offering that would not be otherwise be
available without the versatility offered by S57.6
Out-of-band signaling, initially called Common Channel Interoffice
Signaling ("CCIS"), was first developed by AT&T as a packet-switched
network.62 The crux of AT&T's new signaling approach was the use of packet
switches called signaling transfer points. At approximately the same time
AT&T was working on a signaling protocol in the United States, the urgent
need for an all-digital network also became apparent to the international
community.63  The International Telecommunications Union ("ITU")
commissioned a study to explore the possibility of an all-digital network. 4
The result was a series of standards now known as SS7.65 SS7 "continues to be
an important strategic element, not only because of its pervasive deployment
and wasteful." 2) In-band signaling is vulnerable to fraud while out-of-band signaling main-
tains several built-in fraud detection devices. NEWTON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 24.
58 HARTE, SIGNALING SYSTEM 7, supra note 29.
59 The Network That's Never Done, supra note 38 ("SS7 networks have been strategi-
cally developed using architectures that can be expanded easily by adding new links through
the deployment of signal transfer points and SCPs.").
60 Id. (quoting Andy Belcher, general manager for SS7 at Hewlett-Packard).
61 See R. Brough Turner, SS7 The Old Standby, TELEPHONY.ONLINE, at
http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom-ssold standby/index.htm (July 10, 2000). There
are some disadvantages to SS7. "It's a very telecom-specific protocol running on a very
telecom-specific infrastructure. It shares little with the rest of the computer industry, so it
has been slow to take advantage of widely available, higher bandwidth technology." Id. The
disadvantages of SS7 only factor into the relationship of SS7 and IP telephony. Experts be-
lieve that SS7 can be made to suit IP-based products in the future. "As new services are de-
ployed over an IP backbone, service providers can directly access SS7 messages and trans-
port them over IP networks to signaling gateways, where they can go back into the
traditional telephone network." Id.
62 There were six signaling systems prior to the advent of SS7, but they existed only on
paper. The immediate predecessor to SS7 was actually deployed on a limited basis, but not
until an international standard was developed were companies willing to invest in building
signaling infrastructure. See SS8 Networks, SS7 Network History Tutorial, at
http://www.ss7.com/History.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
63 See id. (giving a comprehensive history of the development of SS7).
64 After World War II, the ITU became a United Nations Treaty Organization. It was
tasked with setting international standards for telecommunications. Standardization was
essential to seamless communication between countries. See id
65 RUSSELL, SIGNALING SYSTEM #7,supra note 30, at 1.
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today, supporting many revenue-generating applications, but because it is also
a critically important infrastructure for emerging packet-based Next
Generation Networks (NGN)."66
SS7 networks are physically distinct networks that shadow the voice
component of the PSTN 7 The significance of the separate facilities cannot be
understated. Many of the benefits of SS7 arise from the fact that the signaling
needed to set up and complete a telephone call does not require any
participation from the portion of the network, the voice trunks, which will
eventually carry the call.6" Voice trunks are an expensive, finite commodity in
the network. Reserving their use for successful calls dramatically decreases
how much the trunks need to be engaged and, consequently, how many voice
trunks a carrier must purchase and maintain.69
I1. THE 1996 ACT INTRODUCES REGULATED COMPETITION TO
THE LOCAL TELEPHONE MARKET AND TO SIGNALING
The provision of telephone service was once considered a "natural
monopoly."7 AT&T and its Bell Operating Companies, which together held
an unshakable grip on both the local and long distance markets, did everything
they could to encourage that belief.7' By 1982, the FCC and courts could no
longer ignore the Bell efforts to prevent competition. In an effort to settle a
landmark antitrust suit, AT&T and the Justice Department entered into a
Consent Decree, commonly known as a Modification of the Final Judgment
("MFJ").73 The MFJ stipulated that the 22 Bell Operating Companies be
66 See NMS COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 49.
67 The industry considers "SS7" synonymous with "signaling" because the SS7 protocol
is universal for telephony signaling. NEWTON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 623; Mobile
Networking, White Paper, at http://www.mobilein.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) ("SS7 is
a critical component of modem telecommunications systems."). SS7 networks utilize a
packet switch which is the precursor to packet-based voice telephony. See FCC Chairman
Michael K. Powell, Remarks at the NSTAC XXVII Executive Session Luncheon at U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (May 19, 2004) ("Innovative entrepreneurs are replacing yester-
day's slow, limited networks with many different types of high-speed, full-service digital
networks, such as BPL, WIFI, FTTH, Cable Modem and DSL."). The industry hopes to
duplicate the speed and efficiency of the SS7 network in the voice network by utilizing
packet technology. ("Packets, like water flowing toward a downhill destination, are tena-
cious in seeking out alternate paths.").
68 RUSSELL, SIGNALING SYSTEM #7, supra note 30, at 63-64.
69 See id. at 304-09 (describing the role of SS7 in call set-up and tear-down).
70 See TELECOM CRASH COURSE, supra note 14, at 136-38.
71 See COMMS. ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 48-49.
72 Id. at 48. ("The testimony and the documentary evidence adduced by the government
demonstrate that the Bell System has violated the antitrust laws in a number of ways over a
lengthy period of time.").
73 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 184-85 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub
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organized into seven RBOCs independent from the AT&T parent company. 4
The MFJ also prohibited the RBOCs from providing any interexchange or
long-distance services so long as they "retained the ability to use local
monopolies to impede interexchange competition by engaging in
discrimination and cross-subsidization."75  The MFJ imposed
"nondiscrimination obligations and detailed requirements that BOCs provide
all interexchange carriers ("IXCs") with equal access" to the RBOC facilities
at 'cost-based' rates".76
After the MFJ, AT&T was met with increasingly effective competition in
the long-distance market, which was evidenced by rapidly dropping per-minute
charges.77 Even with the MFJ limitations in place, the RBOCs continued to
wield firm monopoly power in the local telephone market."8 The burgeoning
competition in the long distance market gave hope to legislators that they could
replicate that success with sufficient incentives.79 A groundswell built for
fundamental reform of telecommunications law and policy. According to
William J. Byrnes, at least four basic forces led to a major statutory overhaul:
the need to give more specific interconnection direction in the statute, the BOC
desire for relief from MFJ limitations on their entry into long-distance service
and manufacturing, the need to re-allocate jurisdiction between the FCC and
the state agencies, and growing support for deregulation." Reform came in the
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Several excellent articles have been
written discussing the MFJ in great detail. See generally Warren G. Lavey & Dennis W.
Carlton, Economic Goals and Remedies of the AT&T Modified Final Judgment, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1497 (1983); Steven Semeraro, The Antitrust-Telecom Connection, 40 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 555, 561-62 (2003); see also William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Com-
petition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 455-56 (2003) (discussing the
placement of the MFJ in the broader landscape of antitrust law).
74 CoMMs. ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 49. Massive consolidation in the
industry has whittled the original seven RBOCs down to four. The remaining RBOCs are
BellSouth, Qwest Communications, SBC Communications and Verizon Communications.
75 Id. (noting further that the RBOCs transferred interexchange assets to AT&T upon
divestiture).
76 Id.
77 See Brian Quinton, Nickel Defense: AT&T Strives to Protect Long-Distance Reve-
nues, TELEPHONY.ONLINE, at http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom nickel def-
enseatt/index.htm (Sept. 6, 1999) (describing AT&T's strategy to compete with the 5-cent-
a-minute plans offered by Sprint and MCI); cf Kevin Fitchard, Minute Waltz,
TELEPHONY.ONLINE, at http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom minute waltz/index.htm
(Jan. 26, 2004) ("Wireline telecom is starting to emulate wireless. Specifically carriers are
dropping the per-minute charges that characterized long-distance telecom in the U.S. since
the industry's inception.").
78 COMMS. ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 49-50.
79 See H.R. No. 104-204, at 202 (1996) (contained in THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
OF 1996: LAW& LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Robert E. Emeritz et al. eds., 1996)).
80 COMMS. ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 50. ("The fact that nearly all of
the major players in the legislative deliberations wanted something badly furnished the pre-
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form of the 1996 Act.8 The 1996 Act represented a ground-breaking effort to
introduce competition to the local telephone market.8"
A. The Beginning of Local Competition: The 1996 Act83
After much debate, Congress passed the 1996 Act which dictated that each
RBOC open its local market to competition.84 While the 1996 Act contained
several arguably onerous obligations on the part of the RBOCs to open the
local market, it also offered the RBOCs the opportunity to enter the then
lucrative long distance market if they could demonstrate compliance with a 14-
point competition checklist.85  Congress intended for this multi-layered
approach to yield measurable competition in the local market. 6
When Congress enacted the 1996 Act, it intended to create an environment
to foster competition that would ultimately benefit the consumer.87 Some
manifestations of competition are more evident than others and, therefore,
more visible to the end user. The drafters of the legislation understood that for
consumer-level competition to develop in the local market, Congress, the FCC
and the State Commissions had to micromanage the wholesale elements of
local telephony to produce the intended effect.88 Congress believed that in
requisite for the arranging of a compromise package.").
81 See 1996 Act, supra note 1.
82 The Communications Act of 1934 received only modest revision in the 62 years be-
tween its passage and the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
83 This article focuses on the traditional provision of local telephone service. The emer-
gence of wireless telephony as a viable competitor to the traditional network exceeds the
scope of this case study, but it is worthy of discussion and will likely shape future discus-
sions of competition by Congress. See Travis Larson, Growth Continues to be Hallmark of
Wireless Industry, at http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id = 126-10152003 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2004) ("The Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association (CTIA)
today released its mid-year 2003 data survey results, which show skyrocketing data reve-
nues and strong annual growth in overall revenues, subscribership and usage.").
84 See 47 U.S.C. §251 (2000). Max Paglin's treatise provides an outstanding historical
perspective of the Communications Act of 1934. See also COMMS. ACT LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 2.
85 47 U.S.C. §271(2)(B)(i)-(xiv) (2000). The competitive checklist includes: intercon-
nection, nondiscriminatory access to network elements, nondiscriminatory access to the
poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way, local loop transmission, local transmission, local
transport, local switching, nondiscriminatory access to 911, E91 1, directory assistance and
operator call completion services, white pages directory listings, local number portability,
nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling, dialing parity, reciprocal
compensation and resale.
86 See generally THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: LAW & LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
(Robert E. Emeritz et al. eds., 1996) (providing a detailed discussion of the legislative his-
tory of the 1996 Act).
87 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
88 See generally 47 U.S.C. §251 (2000); In re Implementation of the Local Competition
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order for true competition to develop, interconnection must be facilitated, and
building blocks of the incumbent-owned local network, including signaling,
must be made available to competitors at a wholesale 9 cost.9"
Signaling was one of the original network elements Congress identified as
essential.9 Congress identified fourteen essential network elements that the
RBOC had to demonstrate were irrevocably available to CLECs before the
RBOC could offer interexchange service.92 In implementing the 1996 Act, the
Commission acknowledged that access to signaling networks was critical to
build local competition. 93
Congress envisioned local competition flourishing upon passage of the 1996
Act.94  In actuality, years of litigation and political maneuvering plagued
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696 (1999) [hereinafter UNE Re-
mand Order] (prohibiting incumbent LECs from separating currently combined network
elements before providing them to requesting carriers), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom.
WorldCom, Inc. v. United States Telecom Ass'n, 538 U.S. 940 (2003).
89 The appropriate definition of the wholesale cost for unbundled network elements
("UNEs") sparked a robust debate and much contemplation by the FCC. See Local Compe-
tition Order, supra note 13, at paras. 630-740. The FCC adopted Total Element Long-run
Incremental Cost ("TELRIC") as the method to calculate what an RBOC could charge a
CLEC. Id. at para. 672.
90 Joan Engebretson, The Great Wait, TELEPHONY.ONLINE, at http://www.telephony-
online.com/ar/telecomgreat wait/index.htm (Jan. 4, 1999) ("Incumbents claim they have
opened their markets to competition and they have rolled out the red carpet for CLECs as
wholesale customers. But some CLECs say the process of obtaining unbundled elements
from incumbents is still too complicated."). The elements of the incumbent's network must
be provided to CLECs at a low cost. Prices for the UNEs rests with the individual state
commissions. The result is a wide range of price for the same element. For example, "an
unbundled loop.., costs anywhere from $2.59 in Chicago to more than $70 in rural Arkan-
sas." Id.
91 47 U.S.C. §271(c)(2)(B)(x) (2000) (outlining the competitive checklist of the essen-
tial pieces of the incumbent network that must be irrevocably open to competition prior to
RBOC entry into the interexchange market).
92 Id.
93 See Local Competition Order, supra note 13, at para. 455 ("Signaling systems facili-
tate the routing of telephone calls between switches. Most LECs employ signaling networks
that are physically separate from their voice networks, and these "out-of-band" signaling
networks simultaneously carry signaling messages for multiple calls.").
94 Even the FCC believed that the market was ripe for local competition. Implementa-
tion of the Telecomm. Act of 1996 Before the House Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Finance,
104h Cong. (1996) (statement of former FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt).
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 creates a mechanism, whether through agree-
ment or through arbitration, for connecting complex telecommunications networks plug
to plug... We will also continue to work with our state and local colleagues, the in-
dustry, consumers and this Subcommittee to fulfill the Act's promise of open and com-




implementation of the 1996 Act. This litigation altered the FCC's initial vision
of competition in the telecommunications markets, but much more
significantly, it delayed the full implementation of Congress' vision.95
B. The Heartache of Implementation: The Local Competition Order and the
Formative Litigation
The FCC was tasked with implementing the 1996 Act. The Commission
issued three primary orders: the Local Competition Order,6 the Universal
Service Order,97 and the Access Reform Order.98 The Local Competition Order
contained the majority of rules designed to implement Congress' vision for the
local telephone markets. In drafting the Local Competition Order, the FCC
considered signaling to be so essential to a successful, modem
telecommunications network, it was one of the original enumerated unbundled
network elements ("UNEs") that RBOCs were required to offer to all CLECs.99
Almost immediately upon adoption, the FCC's Local Competition Order
faced legal challenges that ultimately reached the United States Supreme
Court.' 0 The litigation created significant uncertainty in the industry during
95 AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). The Supreme Court generally
upheld the FCC's exercise of jurisdiction in implementing rules affecting intrastate tele-
communications. Id. at 385. The Court likewise upheld the Commission's definition of net-
work element and its application to OSS and vertical switching functions. Id. at 386-387.
The FCC's pick and choose rules were upheld with some reservations. Id. at 395-97. How-
ever, the Court rejected the FCC's conclusions regarding the "necessary and impair" stan-
dard in the 1996 Act. Id. at 387-92.
96 See Local Competition Order, supra note 13, at para. 6. (referring to its Orders as the
"competition trilogy," The FCC stated, "[T]he rules that we adopt to implement the local
competition provisions of the 1996 Act represent only one part of a trilogy.").
97 In re Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 8776
(1997) [hereinafter Universal Service Order].
98 In re Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange
Carriers, Transport Rate Structure and Pricing, End User Common Line Charges, First Re-
port and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 15982, at paras. 1-5 (DATE) [hereinafter Access Charge Re-
form Order].
99 Local Competition Order, supra note 13, at para. 482.
Access to signaling systems continues to be a critical element to providing competing
local exchange and exchange access service. The vast majority of calls made over in-
cumbent LEC networks are set-up and controlled by separate signaling networks. In-
cumbent LECs argue that access to signaling systems and associated databases is al-
ready available from other providers and therefore, they should not have to unbundled
them for access by competitors.
Id. Other required UNEs included: loops, switching, interoffice transmission, and Opera-
tional Support Systems ("OSS"). Id. at para. 27.
100 See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997); AT & T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
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the years the courts debated the fate of the 1996 Act.' 0'
The FCC's jurisdiction was the primary challenge to the Local Competition
Order. 2 The State Commissions and the CLECs argued that the FCC's rules
implementing the 1996 Act exceeded the jurisdiction granted to it in the
Communications Act of 1934.03 In 1997, the Eighth Circuit agreed and
vacated most of the FCC's rules. " Upon appeal, in 1999, the Supreme Court
reversed most of the Eighth Circuit's findings, but the Court did find that the
FCC needed to give more careful thought and consideration to the "necessary
and impair" standard. 5  Although the FCC was directed to review its
unbundling rules, the majority of its rules implementing the local competition
envisioned by Congress were firmly established, albeit three years later than
anticipated. 6  The unbundling rules, which effected the regulation of
signaling, continued to plague the Commission.
Following the Supreme Court decision, a flurry of investment and growth in
the telecommunications industry ensued. 7 New CLECs quickly emerged and
began reselling telecommunications services."' Resale presented an easy
mechanism for entry into the market, but it did not encourage CLECs to make
the substantial capital investment required to construct an independent
telecommunications network."° Even at the height of the CLECs' business
cycle, some analysts cautioned against exponential CLEC growth."0
101 See generally id.
102 Id. at 374.
103 Id. Other issues under review included the extent to which a network element had to
be unbundled and the validity of the FCC's interpretation of the "pick and choose" provision
of the 1996 Act. Id.
104 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 796 (8th Cir. 1997). The Court said it found
nothing in the 1996 Act clear enough to overcome the presumption favoring state authority
in the 1934 Act. The Court described the presumption as "hog tight, horse high, and bull
strong, preventing the FCC from intruding on the states' intrastate turf." Id.
105 AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387-88 (1999).
106 Id. at 388. The Supreme Court directed the FCC to "reevaluate the unbundling obli-
gations of Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996." UNE Remand Order, su-
pra note 88, at para. 1.
107 See Engebretson, supra note 90.
108 The 1996 Act required RBOCs to offer essential pieces of the network for resale at
below-cost rates. Phillip J. Britt, The Resale Route, TELEPHONY.ONLINE, at
http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecomresaleroute/index.html (Jan. 11, 1999) ("The local
resale market, which has grown to more than 1000 active competitive local exchange carri-
ers, was projected to have more than 3 million access lines and $5 billion in revenues by the
end of 1998, according to The Association for Local Telecommunications Services.").
109 Id. ("Although local carriers can choose to build their own telecommunications in-
frastructures-as MFS and Teleport did before the telecom act-it's much more effective to
resell local service . . . Building requires a significant capital investment that few carriers
are willing to make.").
110 Id. ("Such fast growth isn't for everyone. 'Speed can be dangerous,' Gavillet [Ron
Gavillet, Executive VP of Strategy for USN Comm.] says. 'Control is critical."').
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Regardless of the growth in the CLEC business, true competition failed to truly
develop in the local market until the RBOCs took advantage of the "stick and
the carrot" approach contained in the 1996 Act.
C. Local Competition Begins to Emerge: RBOCs Seek Section 271 Approval
The 1996 Act created the opportunity for the RBOCs to shed "the last
vestiges of the Modification of Final Judgment" and enter into the long
distance marketplace."' The RBOCs enthusiastically reached for the "carrot"
of long distance entry."2  Although the process was slow and required
monumental fact-finding on the state level, the RBOCs worked diligently to
open the local markets to enough competition to meet the required elements in
the 1996 Act."3
Ameritech made the first effort to meet the 14-point checklist, albeit
unsuccessfully at first, to gain approval from the FCC to enter the lucrative
long distance market." 4 The FCC articulated and refined the requirements of
local competition and the specific demands of the 14-point checklist through
its examination of the early RBOC applications. The resulting orders each
went a little further in explaining the FCC's vision of local competition than
the bare rules." 5 Bell Atlantic received the first approval from the FCC to offer
I I Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Before the House Subcomm.
on Telecomm. and Finance, 104 th Cong. (1996) (statement of Reed E. Hundt, former Chair-
man of the FCC).
112 RBOCs invested incredible resources in attempting to prove to State Commissions
and the FCC that they met the competitive checklist. CLECs likewise expended resources
in disputing the claims of the RBOCs and extract concessions from the RBOCs to further
enhance the competitive environment. In the midst of RBOC concessions, there was a Con-
gressional movement to provide protection to RBOC interests. See Internet Freedom and
Broadband Deployment Act of 2001 H.R. 1542. The proposed legislation shielded RBOCs
from regulation of interLATA data regulation. Opponents of the legislation argued that it
would slow CLEC infrastructure investment. See News Briefs, TECH L.J. (June 1, 2001).
113 See Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Before the House Sub-
comm. on Telecomm. and Finance, 104 th Cong. (1996) (statement of Reed E. Hundt, former
Chairman of the FCC). Chairman Hundt expressed his concern to Congress that the relation-
ship between the Bells and the long distance carriers was inherently inequitable. "[T]he
long distance companies need the BOCs to complete a call, whereas no BOC needs a long
distance company to complete a local call. Nor will any BOC need a long distance com-
pany as an ally to go into the long distance market." Id.
114 Ameritech filed its application for entry into the Michigan market on January 2,
1997. See WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FCC, RBOC APPLICATIONS TO PROVIDE IN-
REGION, INTERLATA SERVICES UNDER § 271, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Com-
mon Carrier/in-regionapplications/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
11 The first order approving an application for Section 271 approval was approximately
700 pages. The subsequent Orders specifically referred to and built upon the analysis prof-
fered in the initial Order. In re Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization
Under Section 271 of the Communications Act To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service
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long distance to its local territory in New York on December 22, 1999."6 The
Commission found, among other things, that Bell Atlantic met its obligation to
provide nondiscriminatory access to signaling networks." 7 Although Bell
Atlantic's application met strenuous opposition by competitors, no CLEC
argued that Bell Atlantic's provision of signaling was deficient or even offered
anecdotal evidence of failure in the signaling network."'
It took almost four years for the remainder of the RBOCs to gain approval to
enter the long distance market in all states. The FCC approved the last
RBOC's Section 271 Application, Qwest, in Arizona, on December 3, 2003."'
The lack of significant controversy regarding signaling lends further credibility
to the growing competition in the signaling market. The network elements,
such as interconnection and loops that CLECs could only procure from the
RBOC, received strenuous argument and voluminous evidence from
disgruntled CLECs in the 271 proceedings before the individual state
commissions and the FCC.'20
D. Rise of Competition in the Signaling Market
In 1997, Telephony.Online declared: "[t]he quiet period is over for SS7.' 2'
By that time, investment in the signaling network had slowed because most
in the State of New York, 15 FCC Rcd. 3953 (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Bell Atlantic 271
Order].
116 Id.
Our decision today approving Bell Atlantic's application represents the culmination of
extensive federal and state efforts implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
This action builds on the experience that this Commission has gained from reviewing
prior Section 271 applications and developing rules to implement Section 251 of the
Communications Act.
Id. at para. 2.
17 Id. at para. 366. The Commission notes that no commentators allege that Bell At-
lantic failed to meet Checklist Item 10. Id
118 Id.
"9 "This Order, granting the final Section 271 application, marks the end of a long,
transformative process that has opened local telecommunications markets and augmented
long distance competition throughout the country." In re Application by Qwest Comm. Int'l
Inc. for Authorization to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Arizona, FCC 03-309
(Dec. 3, 2003) (separate statement of Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy).
120 See BellAtlantic 271 Order, supra note 115, at paras. 63-80 (discussing interconnec-
tion) and paras. 268-336 (discussing local loops).
121 The Network That's Never Done, supra note 38. Prior to the 1996 Act, RBOCs con-
trolled their SS7 networks, but were required to provide access. See Elkhart Tele. Co. v.
Southwestern Bell Tele., Memorandum Opinion and Order, II FCC Rcd. 1051, DA 95-
2342 (1995) (holding that despite party disagreement about appropriate pricing mechanism,




local exchange carriers had purchased the two signal transfer points per Local
Access and Transport Area ("LATA") required by the FCC. 22 The passage of
the 1996 Act and the increase in CLECs changed the status quo. CLECs
needed to either lease SS7 capacity from the incumbent carriers or construct
their own SS7 infrastructure. '23 However, the required signaling infrastructure
represented a substantial capital investment, so most CLECs sought to lease
capacity or seek other alternatives. '
SS7 networks are designed to be physically separate from the voice
network.'25 The physical independence of the signaling network from the
traditional voice network creates an opportunity for third-party vendors to
provide signaling services as a stand-alone service from the traditional
infrastructure required to provide voice and data services. Competitors have
seized this opportunity to provide a commercial alternative to the incumbent-
owned network.'2"
1. Third-Party Vendors Offer Competitive Alternative to RBOC Signaling
Networks
Third-party signaling providers seized the opportunity to provide an
alternative to the RBOCs' network and their efforts generated genuine
competitors to the RBOCs for all signaling services.'27  Several prominent
vendors, such as Illuminet (owned by VeriSign) and SNET, began offering
comprehensive signaling services to CLECs' 28 lnterexchange carriers created
122 The Network That's Never Done, supra note 38. Signal transfer points ("STPs") act
as the "traffic cop" in the signaling network. STPs route signaling messages from the two
signal switching points ("SSPs"). The presence of the STPs prevents each of a carrier's
SSPs from having to be directly connected to every other SSP.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 RUSSELL, SIGNALING SYSTEM #7, supra note 30, at 63-64.
126 See, e.g., VeriSign website, at http://www.verisign.com/telecom/products/net-
work/ss7.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004). llluminet, owned by VeriSign, has become one
of the largest and most aggressive marketers of a nationwide alternative signaling network.
127 Sellers of SS7 offer numerous services including the basic connection services and
enhanced services such as access to databases for caller identification information. Services
can be divided into two central categories: basic call set-up and enhanced services. The ba-
sic function of the Integrated Services Digital Network User part in the SS7 system is to
control setup, connection, and release of the circuit switched network connection between
the subscriber line exchange terminations." LAWRENCE HARTE ET AL, SIGNALING SYSTEM 7
BASICS 61 (Althos Publishing 3d ed. 2003). The Transaction Capabilities Application Part
("TCAP") "provides non-circuit related information transfer capabilities and generic ser-
vices to application." Id. at 77.
128 See generally VERISIGN.COM, at http://www.verisign.com/telecom/products/net-
work/ss7.html ("Leverage the power of the largest independent SS7 in North America with-
out the cost or complication of building your own network."). Other providers, such as SS8
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a side business of leasing SS7 connectivity to wireless providers.'29 Even
CLECs saw the potential in offering SS7 to other CLECs. 3" Although this
section focuses on the competitive providers of signaling service, it is worth
noting that there is also significant competition in the development of SS7
technology.1
3
However, it took time for the third-party vendors to develop reliable
signaling networks.'32 A failure in the SS7 network creates catastrophic failure
in the affected portion of the PSTN 3 3  In 1999, the FCC conducted a
proceeding reevaluating the "necessary and impair" standard as required by the
FCC in Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC.34 During that process, several CLECs
expressed concern to the Commission over the ability of third-party signaling
vendors to match the reliability and efficiency of the RBOC signaling
network.'35 The FCC concluded in the UNE Remand Order, "[t]he ubiquitous
nature of an incumbent LEC's signaling network provides it with advantages
that competitive LECs cannot achieve through use of alternative signaling
networks.' 36 Over time, the third-party providers invested additional capital in
Networks, Intel, and Cisco, offer SS7 development platforms for enhancing existing SS7
networks. See also http://www.SS8networks.com; http://www.intel.com/network/csp/sol-
utions/ss7/7194ovr.htm. (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
129 Kathleen Cholewka, Sending the Right Signals: SS7 Technology, the Wireline Stal-
wart, Can Beef Up PCS Networks, Too, TELEPHONY.ONLINE, at http://telephony-
online.com/ar/telecom sendingrightsignals/index.htm (Feb. 9, 1998) ("Major carriers,
such as AT&T, Sprint and MCI also lease SS7 connectivity to wireless providers.").
130 ICG Telecom Acquires SS7 Business of Pace Network Services, COMM. TODAY, Aug.
16, 1996, LEXIS, Nexis Library, COMTDY File.
131 Alternative SS7, supra note 52 ("Signaling is really just the message-based interac-
tion necessary to initiate certain activities. It will certainly be a key enabler for almost every
useful technology in the Internet.") (quoting John Yoakum, senior manager in emerging
business with Nortel's signaling solutions group).
132 UNE Remand Order, supra note 88, at para. 397, n.777.
133 Illuminet Says Fiber Facility Failure Caused SS7 Outage, COMM. TODAY, Mar. 2,
1998, LEXIS, Nexis Library, COMTDY File. ("Illuminet Inc. said a fiber facility failure
caused a disruption in signaling between SS7 routers in Mattoon, I11. and Rock Hill S.C.,
creating a telephone outage that shut down the New York Mercantile Exchange earlier this
week.").
34 The FCC's reexamination of the necessary and impair standard yielded the UNE
Remand Order. The FCC redefined the standard and applied it again to the elements, in-
cluding signaling, it believed the RBOCs needed to offer to CLECs on an unbundled basis.
UNE Remand Order, supra note 88, at para. 397.
35 Id. at para. 397, n.777. Time Warner cited "alternative vendors' inability to attain
personnel with the requisite skill and experience to operate a reliable SS7 signaling net-
work." Id. Cox stated that the "use of third party vendors can result in delays and errors
that would not result if a CLEC is connected directly with the ILEC signaling system." Id.
(internal quotes omitted).
136 Id. at para. 395. CLECs were changing their approach to SS7 even while the FCC
was writing the UNE Remand Order; see also CLEC Takes Command of Its Own SS7 Net-
work, COMM. TODAY, Jan. 21, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Library, COMTDY File. ("Vancouver-
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their signaling infrastructure and developed a generally more reliable product,
which resulted in a network much more comparable to the RBOCs' signaling
networks.'37
The third-party vendors offer a versatility that, in some circumstances, the
RBOCs cannot match.' For example, a CLEC may typically purchase one
functionality, such as basic call set-up, from the RBOC and other services,
such as enhanced database services, from the vendor without being required to
purchase the other.'39 This ability to tailor the signaling services it needs gives
the CLEC added flexibility to meet its needs.
One of the principal differences in the services offered by an RBOC versus a
third-party provider is the potential scope of service. Most third-party
providers offer access to a nationwide signaling network that exceeds what a
typical RBOC can offer. The four remaining RBOCs maintain elaborate
signaling networks in their respective regions, but the signaling product offered
by an RBOC does not extend beyond its service area. 4 CLECs may purchase
access to the RBOC network, but for nationwide signaling, the CLEC must
negotiate with each RBOC. 4 ' In contrast, the third-party vendors combine
their own networks with access to each of the RBOC networks to offer CLECs
one point of access for nationwide coverage.'42 This functionality sets the
offering of the third-party vendors apart from the RBOCs and demonstrates
authentic competition.
2. Signaling Litigation Further Defines Competitive Relationships
Development of competition in the signaling market led to proposed
based GST Telecommunications, Inc., a competitive local exchange carrier hopes to jump
ahead of competitors in the race to converge voice and data by supporting its own signaling
system seven network.").
'37 SS7 equipment vendors also stepped up investment during this time period. See Prof-
itable Relationship Pressed For SS7 and IP, COMM. TODAY, Mar. 5, 1999, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, COMTDY File.
138 A small CLEC with a limited service area may be better served by dealing directly
with the RBOC. The benefits of a third-party vendor are more dramatic for a larger regional
or national CLEC who needs more dynamic services and a national service. TRO, supra
note 28, at para. 545.
139 See generally SS8 Networks website, at http://www.SS8networks.com (last visited
Oct. 31, 2004).
140 See generally SBC Accessible Letter, at http://www.sbc.com/Large-Files/Mi-
LD2/Supplemental AppendixI/Tab_0005/CLECALL03-053.doc (May 2, 2003) (refers to
SBC's 13-state SS7 infrastructure in discussion of need of customers to adhere to Telcordia
standards).
141 Id.
142 Illuminet Says Fiber Facility Failure Caused SS7 Outage, COMM. TODAY, Mar. 2,
1998, LEXIS, Nexis Library, COMTDY File.
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changes in the pricing structure for signaling.'43 Prior to the 1996 Act,
signaling was provided by the RBOCs and the cost was embedded in the
historic pricing structure.'" The unbundling of signaling triggered a
fundamental change in how RBOCs charged for access to the network.
CLECs, and other customers requiring access to the signaling network,
purchased signaling either pursuant to an interconnection agreement or the
RBOC tariff. The process of detangling signaling costs led to tariff revisions
for many RBOCs, which inevitably led to litigation.
In one signaling dispute, several CLECs challenged BellSouth's attempt to
revise the signaling section of its Florida tariff before the Florida Public
Service Commission ("PSC").45 BellSouth, like many RBOCs, sought to
revise the mechanism by which the CLEC, and other purchasers of signaling,
were billed for SS7 services. BellSouth defended its revised tariff and stated
that it was attempting to assign the costs of signaling to the user of the service,
through a per-message charge, rather than leave cost recovery embedded
switched access. 46  Unfortunately, the practical effect of this approach
increased signaling costs to CLECs which few state commissions would allow,
because it was perceived as harmful to competition.
In February 2003, the Florida PSC issued a decision on the majority of
issues in the case. It upheld some of the issues in favor of BellSouth but
ultimately found BellSouth could not increase the price of signaling for local
competitors via tariff.4 7  Ultimately, the parties entered into a stipulation
whereby BellSouth withdrew its per message charge and reverted to the higher
switching cost that existed prior to the tariff revision.'48
143 See generally In Re Ameritech Operating Companies, Petition for Waiver of Part 59
of the Commission's Rules to Establish Unbundled Rate'Elements for SS7 Signaling, DA-
96-446 (March 26, 1996). Ameritech was the first Bell to separate the cost of signaling
from access charges. By revising its tariff and creating separate rate elements, Ameritech
was able to charge for SS7 as a stand alone service. Id.
144 Id.
145 Joint Petition, US LEC of Florida, Time Warner Telecom of Florida, and ITC Delta-
Corn Communications, Objecting To and Requesting Suspension of Proposed CSS7 Access
Arrangement Tariff Filed By BellSouth, at http://www.psc.state.fl.us (filed Feb. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter In re US LEC].
146 In re US LEC, Stipulation between the parties (filed June 7, 2004).
'47 In re US LEC, Vote Sheet. The PSC agreed that contrary to BellSouth's contention,
its SS7 tariff was not revenue neutral.
148 In re US LEC, Stipulation between the parties (filed June 7, 2004). It is interesting
to note that it took over two years for the SS7 complaint to reach resolution.
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I11. COMPETITION TAKEN TO THE NEXT LEVEL: THE TRIENNIAL
REVIEW ORDER
Since the passage of the 1996 Act, the FCC, the telecommunications
industry and academia have all attempted to assess the success of the local
competition provisions of the Act.149  Deciding whether the 1996 Act has
succeeded or failed usually depends on who is doing the assessment and what
factors they examine. One option is to examine the net effect on the consumer,
which the FCC has done at regular intervals. 5 Another, arguably more
149 KEVIN A. HASSETT & LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, AT&T, THE ROLE OF COMPETITION IN
STIMULATING TELECOM INVESTMENT (Oct. 2002) ("[S]trengthening competition in the tele-
com sector is the key to restoring telecom investment."); see also DALE N. HATFIELD &
DAVID E. GARDNER, AN ESSAY ON COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND INVESTMENT IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1997); see also Solveig Singleton, Written Submission of the Com-
petitive Enter. Inst., delivered at the Dep't of Commerce, Int'l Trade Division Manufactur-
ing Roundtables Proceeding, available at http://www.cei.org/pdf/3634.pdf (July 18, 2003)
("[T]he regulatory regime has been plagued by uncertainty due to litigation and overlapping
state and federal jurisdiction ... U.S. regulatory policy encouraged broad, unsustainable
investment in telecommunications companies that added no real economic value to the net-
works."). Id. at I [hereinafter Singleton Statement].
150 The FCC collects competition data from several sources and reports that data on a
regular basis. For example, the FCC maintains a webpage dedicated to competition. See
http://www.fcc.gov/competition (last visited May 31, 2004) ("The FCC's strategic goal for
competition is to support the Nation's economy by ensuring that there is a comprehensive
and sound competitive framework for communications services."). Further, the Commis-
sion issues biannual reports regarding local competition statistics. See, e.g., INDUSTRY
ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU LOCAL TELEPHONE
COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2003, (2003) ("We present here summary statistics of
the latest data on local telephone service competition in the United States as reported in the
Commission's local competition and broadband data gathering program (Form 477).").
FCC Commissioners regularly report to Congress on the status of competition. See Compe-
tition Issues in the Telecomm. Industry Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 1 0 8 th Cong. (Jan. 14, 2003) (statement of FCC Chairman Michael K.
Powell) ("Seven years into the Act there is notable success-though perhaps significantly
less in some markets than originally expected, and perhaps in different form than was first
envisioned."); see also Competition Issues in the Telecomm. Industry Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108'h Cong. (2003) (statement of FCC
Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy) ("The telecommunications marketplace is more
competitive than at any time in history, with the wireless sector enjoying the most robust
competition."); see also Competition Issues in the Telecomm. Industry Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 1 0 8th Cong. (2003) (statement of FCC
Commissioner Michael J. Copps) ("In 2002, we teed up issues that have the potential to
substantially remake the communications landscape of America for many years to come.");
see also Competition Issues in the Telecomm. Industry Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 1081h Cong. (2003) (statement of FCC Commissioner
Kevin J. Martin) ("Unfortunately, the impact of this downturn has not been limited to the
companies in the telecommunications sector. Employees and their families throughout the
nation have experienced real pain resulting from the downturn and the numerous bankrupt-
cies that have occurred."); see also Competition Issues in the Telecomm. Industry Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 1 0 8th Cong. (2003) (statement of
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comprehensive and reliable option is to examine whether competition has
developed at the wholesale level. 5 ' Examining the evolution of competition at
the wholesale level provides a more accurate snapshot of whether competition
is actually emerging in the local market. 52 Although the growth of competition
in one wholesale service cannot be considered conclusive, it provides valuable
evidence in evaluating whether the 1996 Act and the FCC's competitive
policies implementing the Act have succeeded.
A. Competition's Report Card: The Triennial Review Order
The unbundling of RBOC network elements represents an essential
component of the wholesale competition envisioned in the 1996 Act.'53 The
evolution of the FCC's rules and their application to various UNEs
demonstrate how difficult it can be to strike the right balance between opening
the market to competition and not unfairly disadvantaging the RBOCs.'54 The
FCC's unbundling rules, first articulated in the Local Competition Order, then
the UNE Remand Order, have continued to undergo revision and judicial
scrutiny.'55 At the heart of the issue remains the question of which network
elements must be offered to CLECs on an unbundled basis.'56 To make this
determination, the 1996 Act requires the FCC to consider whether "the failure
to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the
FCC Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein) ("In our decision-making, we cannot undermine
the competition that has emerged to date. If competition is to flourish, the FCC cannot lose
sight of the different ways that Congress explicitly sought to bring it about.").
151 Some commentators have discussed the effect on competition in the wholesale mar-
ket. See Singleton Statement, supra note 149. CEI argues that the FCC's regulations con-
cerning UNEs discourage "efficient investment" in the telecommunications sector. This
article does not take a position on that conclusion, but does suggest that there are signs of
successful competition that are contraindicative of CEI's conclusion.
152 Some commentators suggest that competition in the local telephone market should
not be judged on the number of wireline providers, but on the existence of both wireline and
wireless providers competing for local market share. See Singleton Statement, supra note
149.
153 See 47 U.S.C. §251 (2000).
154 Although most CLECs would probably deny it, the 1996 Act "transferred an impor-
tant set of property rights from incumbents to entrants." See generally ROBERT S. PINDYCK,
MANDATORY UNBUNDLING AND IRREVERSIBLE INVESTMENT IN TELECOM NETWORKS. WHITE
PAPER (Jan. 2004).
'55 See UNE Remand Order, supra note 88, at 3707. The UNE Remand Order requires
ILECs to "offer unbundled access to signaling links and signaling transfer points (STPs) in
conjunction with unbundled switching, and on a stand-alone basis." Id.
156 The FCC requires LNEs be priced using TELRIC. See Local Competition Order,
supra note 13, at paras. 674-703. TELRIC is a "method of figuring out what phone service
should cost based on incremental cost of equipment and labor, not counting the embedded
cost." NEWTON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 692.
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telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services it seeks to
offer."'57 Significant judicial review has been given to the FCC's efforts to
implement the "impairment" standard. More than eight years after passage of
the 1996 Act, the FCC continues to struggle to construct rules that pass judicial
muster.58 The D.C. Circuit has examined, and rejected, the FCC's treatment of
impairment on several occasions.59
The most recent manifestation of the UNE impairment rules was in the
FCC's TRO, which was the FCC's direct response to the Court's rejection of
its earlier attempt to define "necessary and impair."'6 °  The Commission
adopted the general principles of the TRO in February 2004, but due to internal
wrangling, the final rules were not released until August 2004. 61
The FCC delegated much of the required analysis to the state commissions
and provided specific guidelines for the states to use to determine whether or
not barriers to competition continue to impair CLECs.162 It is commonly
recognized that one of the most contested UNEs is switching. In the TRO, the
FCC focused on whether switching met the necessary and impair standard.'63
Rather than make a determination, the FCC adopted a national presumption
that no impairment existed in the enterprise market and impairment does exist
in the mass market.' 64
157 47 U.S.C. §251(d)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
158 The FCC's first effort to implement the impair standard required a network element
to be unbundled if "the quality of the service the entrant can offer, absent access to the re-
quested element, declines and/or the cost of providing the service rises." Local Competition
Order, supra note 13, at para. 285. The Supreme Court struck down the FCC's definition as
unreasonable and remanded the issue to the FCC. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525
U.S. 366, 389-90 (1999).
159 In response to the Supreme Court's rejection of its impairment standard, the FCC
adopted an alternate view that found impairment if "taking into consideration the availabil-
ity of alternative elements outside the incumbent's network, including self-provisioning by a
requesting carrier or acquiring an alternative from a third-party supplier, lack of access to
that element materially diminishes a requesting carriers' ability to provide the services it
seeks to offer." Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, Third Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696, 3725 (1996) (emphasis
added). However, the Court found the FCC's analysis insubstantial and rejected the revised
rules on a number of grounds. United States Telecomm. Ass'n. v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 421-
26 (D.C. Cir. 2002) [ hereinafter USTA 1].
160 After the D.C. Circuit rejected portions of the UNE Remand Order in United States
Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) [hereinafter USTA II], the FCC again
rewrote its unbundling rules and articulated them in the TRO. The D.C. Circuit again re-
viewed the rules and vacated the essential analysis regarding impairment. USTA H.
161 See TRO, supra note 28, at paras. 1-6.
162 See id. at paras. 179-196.
163 See generally id at paras. 211-97 (mass market which includes residential and small
business customers), 298-342 (enterprise market which includes the remaining large busi-
ness customers).
164 Id. The FCC gave the states ninety days to rebut the presumption regarding the en-
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The FCC's TRO received mixed reviews, but the overwhelming tenor was
negative.'65 The FCC's delegation of regulatory responsibility to the States
created profound uncertainty in the markets and among industry analysts.'66
The telecommunications service and manufacturing markets plummeted
following the release of the TRO.'67
Not surprisingly, litigation commenced immediately.66 After extensive
briefing and argument, the D.C. Court of Appeals vacated much of the TRO
and remanded it back to the FCC for further consideration.'69 The resulting
confusion among industry and state commissions created mass chaos.' The
CLECs, led by AT&T, and NARUC sought a stay of the TRO from the
Supreme Court.'7' Although the Court denied the request, the status quo has
been voluntarily sustained by a pledge from the RBOCs not to implement any
change before the end of 2004.12 The FCC is currently working on new UNE
rules.' FCC Chairman Michael Powell, who dissented from the majority of
terprise market and nine months to rebut the presumption regarding mass market switching.
Id.
165 See Singleton Statement, supra note 149. ("Reconciling the need for certainty with
calls for 'granularity' and close attention to particular geographic markets is not easy. But
the majority's view in the Triennial review seems to neglect the need for certainty en-
tirely.").
166 The FCC Presses Auto-Destruct, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2003 ("America's tele-
coms firms are puzzled by the rules that emerged from the chaos. The big local phone com-
panies-the 'Baby Bells'-said they would sue the government: unsurprisingly, as Mr. Pow-
ell's dissent reads like an invitation to do just that.").
167 Following the FCC's TRO, "SBC, BellSouth, Verizon and Qwest lost over 12 billion
dollars. Wireless and equipment companies like Nortel and Lucent posted hundreds of mil-
lions in losses as well." Singleton Statement, supra note 149, at 5-6. The FCC Presses
Auto-Destruct, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2003 ("Smaller, financially weaker carriers such as
Covad could only marvel at the government's vandalism. The first time Covad heard of a
rule change that could kill half its business was on the night before the FCC's decision. Its
share price has duly collapsed.").
168 See USTA 11, supra note 160.
169 Id. The Solicitor General decided not to appeal the D.C. Circuit decision vacating
the Commission's local telephone unbundling rules. See also, Statement of FCC Commis-
sioner Kevin J. Martin, FCC News, June 9, 2004 (noting the Solicitor General's decision to
not appeal the D.C. Circuit decision).
170 Even chaos in the regulatory climate does not change the need for CLECs and
RBOCs to do business. Negotiations over IJNE prices have continued. Donny Jackson,
UNE Negotiations Still Slow, TELEPHONY.ONLINE, http://telephonyonline.com/ar/tele-
comune negotiations slow/index.htm (May 17, 2004) ("Most of the public action on the
LUNE negotiation front has concentrated on CLECs offering various proposals, none of
which have generated a positive response from RBOCs publicly.").
171 Supreme Court Turns Down TRO Stay Request, TELECOM A.M., June 15, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News & Business Library.
172 Id. ("Little immediate change is expected because interconnection agreements re-
main in effect and the Bells have promised to keep the status quo until the end of the year.").
173 "My fellow Commissioners and I will promptly turn to writing a set of sound rules
that ensure access to incumbent networks where competition is truly impaired." FCC
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the TRO provisions vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court, has reaffirmed his
commitment to writing local competition rules that will pass judicial review.
Chairman Powell announced, "I am committed to developing competition rules
that comply with the court's mandate and are faithful to the statutory
objectives of the Telecommunications Act.' 7 4 Chairman Powell believes a
primary objective of the new UNE rules must be to encourage "increased
investment in infrastructure that will continue to drive down prices for
advanced services."'75 A consistent criticism of the FCC's former policy is that
the UNE price controls developed by the Commission discourage the build-out
of new facilities.'76 The new rules will likely limit the ability of CLECs to
indefinitely lease network elements from the RBOCs at the artificially low
TELRIC prices currently mandated.'77
B. Maturation of Competition in the Signaling Market: the Convergence of
Competition and Regulation
As discussed above, the FCC released the long-awaited TRO on August 21,
2003. "' The Commission opined that the state of competition in the signaling
market justified elimination of an ILEC's obligation under the 1996 Act to
provide unbundled access to its signaling systems.'79 The FCC's policy shift
provides real evidence that facilities-based competition exists in signaling.
1. The FCC's Treatment of Signaling in the Triennial Review Order
In the seven paragraphs of the Order devoted to signaling, the Commission
Chairman Michael K. Powell Announces Plans for Local Telephone Competition Rules,
FCC News, June 14, 2004 (quoting Chairman Michael K. Powell).
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Singleton Statement, supra note 149, at 3 (citing comments of FCC Commissioner
Kathleen Q. Abernathy, quoted in Abernathy Describes 'Limited' FCC Role in Wake of
WorldCom Woes, WASHINGTON TELECOM NEWSWIRE, July 9, 2002 ("CLECs were given
access to 'just about every conceivable element' of an incumbent's network at TELRIC
prices. This 'overstimulated' the entry of CLECs who rushed into the market to take advan-
tage of these rates . . . 'Telecom by its very nature is very capital intensive. Long-term in-
vestment, long-term business strategies take a long time to become profitable."').
177 Companies like AT&T have requested that the FCC employ an incremental step
away from UNE-P rather than an abrupt vacation from the requirement that an RBOC offer
UNE-P to CLECs at TELRIC. See AT&T Announces Tentative Agreement to Lease
McLeodUSA Network, XCHANGE, at www.x-changemag.com/hotnews/47h617054.html
(July 6, 2004).
'78 See TRO, supra note 28.
179 Id. at paras. 542-48.
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significantly altered the regulatory paradigm of signaling.8 The Commission
held that where an ILEC does not have to provide switching as a UNE,
likewise signaling no longer must be provided as a UNE.8 :
[1]n the instances in which incumbent LECs will be required to provide access to switching
as a UNE, carriers purchasing the switching UNE must also gain access to incumbent LEC
signaling. in all other cases, however, we determine that there are sufficient alternatives in
the market available to incumbent LEC signaling networks and competitive LECs are no
longer impaired without access to such networks as UNEs for all markets.
82
The Commission based its conclusion on the "maturity" demonstrated in the
last several years in the signaling market by acknowledging that "[t]he record
reflects that multiple alternative providers are available to provide rival
signaling services to competitive LECs."'83 Where CLECs deploy their own
switches, the Commission found no barrier to obtaining signaling or self-
provisioning signaling capabilities.'84 The market opportunities to acquire
signaling absolve the ILEC of the requirement of "offering access to signaling
as a UNE under Section 25 1(c)(3) of the Act."'85
The national scope of the signaling networks of ILECs and alternative
180 Id. at para. 545.
181 Id. at para. 545. The Commission devoted considerably more resources to describing
the test for whether switching must be provided as a UNE. The Commission found that
there is no CLEC impairment to justify a switching UNE in the enterprise (business) market
due to the deployment of switches to serve customers at a DS 1 level and higher. However,
the Commission did generally find impairment in the mass (residential) market where there
has been very little deployment of competitive switches. The TRO provides certain "trig-
gers" to assist the states in their analysis of the impairment standard.
182 Id. at para. 544.
183 Id. at para. 545. ILECs face significant competition for signaling customers. Signal-
ing provider, Illuminet, for example, was purchased by VeriSign which increased its ability
to market its services to a broad range of users. Carolyn Duffy Marsan, VeriSign CEO Talks
About Strategy and the Integration of NSI, NETWORKWORLDFuSION, available at
http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2002/1 31440 04-15-2002.html (Apr. 15, 2002).
184 The proliferation of signaling providers building networks lends support to the
FCC's support of competition in the signaling market. See, e.g., Press Release, Lucent
Technologies Signs Deal With Gateway, at http://www.lucent.com/press/0300/00-
0313.nsa.html (Mar. 13, 2000) (Lucent announced it has signed a $30 million agreement
with Gateway Networks to develop a next-generation fiber network including SS7. "The
Lucent lCD for softswitch is the first commercially available, standards-based SS7 gateway
designed to alleviate congestion on voice networks by diverting data calls away from circuit
switches."); Tellabs Introduces Next-Generation Switch (June 7, 1999) (on file with author)
("The AN2100 GX system incorporates media adaptation, call processing, SS7 signaling
and service creation functions into a uniquely flexible, scalable platform, which enables ser-
vice profilers to reduce costs and create revenue-generating services faster than traditional
methods.").
185 See TRO, supra note 28, at para. 545. The Commission refers to no other section of
the Act as relevant in a discussion of SS7. Notably, there is no implication that §251 (b)(5)
dealing with reciprocal compensation has any place in the discussion. Id.
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providers led the Commission to apply its analysis on a national scope.'86 This
conclusion effectively insulates the decision from action on the State level to
implement rules different than those articulated by the Commission. Although
much of the TRO was vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court
affirmed the FCC's finding of no impairment for signaling.'87 The CLECs
objected to the Commission's findings concerning call-related databases, but
few challenged the signaling conclusions.'88 Ultimately, the Court upheld the
FCC's decision that related to both signaling and databases.'89
2. Regulation of Signaling is not Unfettered
Although the FCC's TRO determines that the signaling market has
matured,9 ° which the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed, that determination appears
to conflict with the statutory language in Section 271 of the 1996 Act.1 91
RBOCs have not been relieved of their obligations under 47 U.S.C.
§ 271(c)(2)(B)'92 to provide access to loops, switching, transport, and
signaling.'93 The FCC has interpreted this provision as requiring an RBOC to
"demonstrate that it provided requesting carriers with nondiscriminatory access
to: (I) signaling networks, including signaling links and signaling transfer
points; (2) certain call-related databases necessary for call routing and
completion, or in the alternative, a means of physical access to the signaling
transfer point linked to the unbundled database .'. .," Commentators and
competitors have questioned whether the FCC's finding of non-impairment for
the RBOC UNE obligation in the TRO, including signaling, implicitly removes
the RBOCs' Section 271 obligation to provide the UNEs' 95 An RBOC
186 Id. at para. 547. The impairment test requires a determination of granularity to de-
termine what role the states have in implementing the Commission's determination. Id.
187 USTA II, supra note 160.
188 Id. at 50.
189 Id.
190 See TRO, supra note 28, at para. 547.
191 47 U.S.C. §271(c)(2)(B)(x) (2000). Signaling represents only one of the UNEs that
are implicated by both Section 271 and the TRO. Several products are required by the com-
petitive checklist but have also been found to be competitive markets. TRO, supra note 28,
at paras. 522-60.
192 47 U.S.C. §271(c)(2)(B)(x) (2000). Checklist Item Ten requires
"[n]ondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling necessary for call routing
and completion." Id.
193 See TRO, supra note 28, at para. 653.
194 In re Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization Under Section 271 of
the Communications Act To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New
York, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 3953, para. 365 (Dec. 22, 1999).
195 Verizon Deploys F7TP in Hopes of Regulatory Relief, TELECOM A.M., Aug. 3, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News & Business Library. "While Verizon has made a big deal about
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theoretically risks FCC enforcement actions, or worse, if it refuses to provide
access'96 to signaling under a theory that the TRO negates the statutory
obligations contained in Section 271.'9
This regulatory catch-22 may create uncertainty for competitors as they
attempt to discern the real impact of the TRO on the signaling market.'98 The
intersection of the TRO and Section 271 has real implications for interpreting
the ultimate effect of the FCC's determination of competition. An argument
can be made that Congress could not have intended Section 271 and the
checklist to cancel out the benefits of developing competition.'99 If Section 271
is not read as flexible, the outcome would be difficult to reconcile with the
competitive intentions of the 1996 Act. A company which has successfully
demonstrated adequate local competition and compliance with the competitive
checklist to attain Section 271 authority to offer long distance would be
penalized by having to continue to provide products on an unbundled basis
that have been determined to be competitively available. The lack of
significant controversy regarding SS7 during the Section 271 proceedings at
the FCC suggests that even in that context there is little justification for
laying fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) in its former GTE states, but it also is quietly deploying
FTTP in more regulated former Bell Atlantic states in hopes of gaining better regulatory
treatment soon." Id. "[T]he company is still seeking clarification that it doesn't have to un-
bundle FTTP facilities under Sec. 271 of the Telecom Act in those states. Although the
FCC eased broadband unbundling requirements under Sec. 251, there's still uncertainty
about Bell obligations under Sec. 27 ." Id.
96 It must be noted that the requirement to provide access to UNEs does not equal an
obligation to provide those UNEs at TELRIC prices.
'97 See 47 U.S.C. §271(d)(6)(3)(A) (2001). The Commission may revoke the 271 au-
thority to offer interexchange service if the RBOC has "ceased to meet any of the conditions
required for such approval." See, e.g., State of Maine Public Utilities Commission, Veri-
zon-Maine Proposed Schedules, Terms, Conditions and Rates for Unbundled Network Ele-
ments and Interconnection and Resold Services, Dkt. No. 2002-682, 12 (Sept. 3, 2004).
We find that a reasonable interpretation of the condition we placed upon Verizon dur-
ing our 271 proceeding, and the condition it committed to fulfill, requires Verizon to
include both its section 251 and 271 unbundling obligations in its wholesale tariff filed
in Maine. Indeed, the reasons underlying the condition apply even more today when
the legal and regulatory landscape has become increasingly confusing and complex,
making it difficult to completely address and negotiate all the issues that might arise in
an interconnection agreement negotiation.
Id.
198 At least one RBOC has publicly expressed its hope that regulatory treatment will be-
come more consistent between Sections 251 and 271. Verizon Deploys FTTP in Hopes of
Regulatory Relief, TELECOM A.M., Aug. 3, 2004, available at LEXIS, News & Business Li-
brary.
199 The FCC has suggested that if a UNE listed in Section 271 is not required to be un-
bundled under Section 251 (c)(3), the RBOC does not have to offer the UNE in compliance
with the Commission's pricing rules. UNE Remand Order, supra note 88, at 3709. How-




continuing to require unbundling.
IV. SUCCESSFUL COMPETITION IN THE WHOLESALE SIGNALING
MARKET: LESSONS FOR OTHER WHOLESALE SERVICES
Competition has not emerged in every aspect of the local
telecommunications market."' Yet, the signaling market was subject to similar
regulatory circumstances as services that failed to develop meaningful
competition. The case study presented in this article suggests that the lessons
learned in the signaling arena may be applied to other services.
The FCC has declared the signaling market "mature."2 ' The existence of
genuine competition where none existed prior to the 1996 Act demonstrates
measurable success. Carriers have a real choice regarding the purchase of
signaling services. Not only can they self-provision signaling, they can
purchase signaling from the incumbent carrier, or contract with several third-
party providers who offer nationwide signaling service, which represents a
much more comprehensive product than what is offered by the incumbent. 2
Pointing to SS7 as an example of competitive success generates as many
questions as answers and requires further discussion to be useful in policy
planning.23 The essential question is: Why have a few services produced
competition where others have failed? The answer may be found in the
particularities of the technology and service; however, the ultimate answer
likely lies with the existence of third-party service providers willing to provide
a legitimate alternative to purchasing SS7 as a UNE from the RBOC.204
200 The debacle of the TRO has hindered the growth of competition by creating profound
uncertainty in the market. Commissioner Copps has recently said he would "welcome an
item on how to bring line sharing back after [the TRO] was vacated by the courts." Powell
Seeks Copps, Adelstein Agreement on Interim TRO Rules, TELECOM A.M., Aug. 4, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News & Business Library. He went further to say, "in light of the le-
thal damage this Commission has inflicted on telephone competition, goodness knows we
need any kind of competitive vehicle we can get." Id.
201 See TRO, supra note 28, at para. 545.
202 See, e.g., VeriSign website, at http://www.verisign.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2005)
for a description of the nationwide signaling service offered by a third-party provider.
203 The FCC found sufficient evidence of competition in additional service markets
which led the FCC to conclude there is no impairment in those services. See TRO, supra
note 28, at paras. 533-60. The FCC specifically found no impairment in shared transport,
packet switching, call-related databases. The availability of viable alternatives was the prin-
ciple justification for its conclusion. In contrast, the FCC found that OSS Functions should
continue to be offered as a UNE. "[W]e find that the systems, databases, and personnel that
the incumbent LEC uses to provide OSS functions represent an extensive infrastructure that
would be difficult, if not impossible, for competitors to duplicate." Id. at para. 564.
204 Third-party providers are offering services other than signaling. "Like CNAM and
LIDB databases, there are third-party vendors available to provide competitive carriers ac-
cess to Toll Free Calling and LNP databases. For instance, Illuminet's SS7 network pro-
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The independence of the signaling network from the underlying PSTN
encouraged the development of competing networks. Evidence suggests that
signaling is not an anomaly and that competitors are seeking similar options in
other critical telecommunications services." 5 An examination of the 14-point
competitive checklist articulated in Section 271 demonstrates other services
that have begun to experience competition. For example, even though the
underlying framework was found deficient by the Court, in the TRO, the FCC
did establish a national presumption that competition exists in the enterprise
switching market."6 Vendors have started to offer other essential services that
were once dominated by the RBOCs, including directory assistance and
operator services.0 7
Some portions of the PSTN may always be less susceptible to competition,
like the local loop, but even those pieces of the network may cease to belong to
the RBOCs. The historic wisdom predicted that the RBOCs will forever
maintain a lock on the local market due to the "last mile problem," but
advances in technology and developing competition has put that conclusion in
serious doubt.00 CLECs and other providers have sought technological
vides access to all toll free numbers in the country for call-routing." See TRO, supra note
28, at para. 555 (citation omitted).
205 See, e.g., AT&T, McLeodUSA Reach Agreement on Residential, Business Local
Phone Service, TELECOMWEB, at http://www.telecomdirectnews.com/do.php/120/8479?29
(July 8, 2004). AT&T and McLeod proposed to the FCC that they would enter into a tenta-
tive agreement under which AT&T would provide local phone service over McLeod's net-
work in select states. In a joint press release, AT&T and McLeodUSA said "finalization of
the agreement requires regulatory clarity in support of facilities-based competition." AT&T
Announces Tentative Agreement to Lease McLeodUSA Network, at http://www.x-
changemag.com/hotnews/47h617054.html (last visited June 1, 2003). The companies want
the FCC to preserve access to network components controlled by RBOCs at stable rates.
Whether the FCC will be willing to accommodate that request is unclear, but it clearly sig-
nals a shift to alternative providers of loop services for CLECs like AT&T. Id.
206 See TRO, supra note 28, at para. 451 ("[W]e establish a national finding that com-
petitors are not impaired with respect to DS I enterprise customers that are served using
loops at the DSI capacity and above.").
207 For example, AT&T offers operator services on a wholesale basis as part of its call-
ing card network. See ATT.com, at http://www.business.att.com/content/whole-
sale cardplatform.pdf. (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
208 "In many communities, last-mile technology represents a major remaining challenge
to high-bandwidth applications such as on-demand television, fast Internet access and Web
pages full of multimedia effects." See searchNetworking.com, at
http://www.searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinitiono,,sid7_gci213568,00.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2004). Wireless providers provide a revolutionary new method to bypass the
traditional RBOC bottleneck. "Bypassing the copper wires that connect a phone company's
central offices to its customers, these wireless Internet service providers can deliver broad-
band more cheaply than digital subscriber lines (DSLs) and can reach out to rural homes and
others not currently served at all except by dial-up." Id.; see also Steven M. Cherry, The
Wireless Last Mile, IEEE SPECTRUM ONLINE, at
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/sepO3/wire.htm (Sept. 2003); Tam
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alternatives to gain entrance to the home." 9 Some have been more successful
than others, but the general trend points to more competition by fewer, stronger
carriers.2 '
The current chaos of the telecommunications markets, attributable to
regulatory gaffes and changing technology, suggests that the FCC will be
making some tough decisions in the near future.2 ' The most recent
breakthrough technology is Voice Over Internet Protocol ("VoIP"), which
utilizes the Internet rather than the PSTN to connect a telephone call.2 2
Regulation of VolP is in its infancy, but the FCC has commenced a rulemaking
proceeding, and its preliminary VoIP decisions indicate that regulation of VolP
will draw careful distinctions between regulation of PSTN and purely Internet-
based services." 3 At least one FCC Commissioner has acknowledged that the
Harbert, That Long, Lonesome Last Mile, ELECTRONIC BUSINESS ONLINE, at
http://www.reed-electronics.com/eb-mag/article/CA411912?industryid=217 (May 1, 2004).
209 Voice over Internet Protocol Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 108"h Cong. (Feb. 24, 2004) (statement of FCC Chairman Michael K. Pow-
ell) [hereinafter Powell Statement].
We [the FCC] have championed the deployment of multiple broadband networks in or-
der to rid ourselves of the intractable 'last mile' problem. We have pushed for greater
deployment of DSL, cable modem, 3G wireless, WIFI, Ultra Wide Band, satellites and
broadband over power lines, just to name a few new services already in commercial
use.
Id.
210 The consolidation of competitive carriers following the telecom crash has produced
fewer, but much stronger, competitors. Also leveling the playing field is new technology,
such as Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP"). Brand names like AT&T have joined
smaller, start-up companies and have lent a great deal of credibility to the technology by
doing so. See Ellen Muraskin, AT&T's VoIP Rollout Heats Up Price War, EWEEK.COM, at
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1621731,00.asp (July 8, 2004). Even the AT&T
brand may not be enough to save the company from financial ruin. S&P Cuts AT&T Debt
Rating to Junk, TELECOM A.M., Aug. 4, 2004, available at LEXIS, News & Business Li-
brary. S&P cut AT&T's debt rating based on declining financials and changes in the tele-
communications industry. "We anticipate that competition will intensify from other large
long distance carriers, the regional Bell operating companies and cable TV companies in the
near-to-intermediate term, further affecting AT&T's weak operating margins." Id.
211 See Christopher Stem, So Long to Long-Distance? WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2004, at El.
What began as a slow change has been accelerating in the past year or so, upending an
industry long viewed as a steady utility. A combination of deregulation and new tech-
nologies has spawned a sometime bewildering choice of pricing plans for consumers
from different players-traditional phone giants, wireless firms, cable systems and
Internet companies.
Id.
212 "When packetized, voice applications are virtually identical to any other Internet ap-
plication, such as email or instant messaging. Consequently, would-be entrepreneurs are
just a website and a server away from offering services that mirror those of a 'phone' com-
pany." Powell Statement, supra note 209, at 1-2.
213 See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T's Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony
Services are Exempt from Access Charges, Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 7457 (Apr. 2004). AT&T
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regulatory challenges presented by VolP are "formidable." 2 4 Going forward,
the only certainty is that the FCC and industry will likely draw upon past
successes to determine the best path to go forward. The emergence of
competition in the signaling market provides an excellent example for the FCC
to use as a starting point.
Perhaps the strongest lesson to be gleaned from the signaling experience is
that meaningful infrastructure investment yields demonstrable competition." 5
It has been said that "[t]he Telecom Act envisioned a world of independent
physical networks competing with each other to provide telecommunications
services in local markets." 2 6 In the signaling context, investment in networks
provided a reliable alternative to the RBOC-owned networks. Although some
argue that building redundant networks wastes resources and harms
competition, the signaling case study suggests otherwise." 7
sought a ruling that its phone-to-phone IP telephony services are exempt from access
charges. The FCC found that "the service that AT&T describes is a telecommunications
service upon which interstate access charges may be assessed." See generally In re IP-
Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd. 4863 (Mar. 10, 2004).
AT&T's service relied upon the PSTN for at least a portion of the service so the FCC regu-
lated it accordingly. In contrast, early indications suggest that purely Internet-based tele-
communications services will not be hindered by the onerous PSTN regulatory framework.
214 Commissioner Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Overview of the Road to Convergence: New
Realities Collide with Old Rules, 12 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 133, 133 (2004) ("In a world
where different platforms are used to provide functionally equivalent services, regulators
must harmonize distinct regulatory frameworks. The challenge is formidable, however, be-
cause the statutory framework that guides the FCC was written before this technological
explosion.").
215 Robert S. Pindyck, Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom
Networks 2 (Dec. 2003) (working paper available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=48038 1).
216 Id.
217 Mark Cooper, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, COMPETITION AT THE
CROSSROADS: THE FUTURE ROLE OF STATE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS IN MAINTAINING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION 2, at http://www.cispa.org/CFA%20UNE%20study-
%200ct7-2003.doc (2003).
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